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Risk Analysis Reportconcerning

First Amended and Restated Operating Agreement

Crestview Development Group LLC (Manager/Sponsor, 5% Class A Interest) and Apex Institutional Partners Fund VII (Investor, 95% Class B Interest) ยท Delaware (venue: Travis County, Texas) Law

1critical
3high
8total risks
NOT SIGNABLE AS-IS
CONCERNING
NOT SIGNABLE AS-IS

The Agreement contains several provisions that deviate materially from market standards for institutional JV operating agreements in ground-up multifamily development. The promote structure is below market for a 5/95 ground-up development JV โ€” current 2025-2026 market typically uses 3-tier structures with higher splits above 15% IRR. The investor's removal rights, capital call default penalties, and fee clawback provisions create asymmetric downside risk for the sponsor that is not commensurate with the deal economics. Three provisions require amendment before execution.

Critical risksCritical

1

High risksHigh

3

Total Risks

8

Executive Summary

This First Amended and Restated Operating Agreement governs Meridian Heights LLC, a Delaware limited liability company formed to develop a 280-unit Class A mixed-use apartment complex with ground-floor retail at 4200 East Riverside Drive in Austin, Texas. The $62 million total capitalization is split 5%/95% between Crestview Development Group LLC as sponsor and Apex Institutional Partners Fund VII as the institutional investor. The Agreement grants Crestview day-to-day management authority subject to a major decision list, with a two-tier promote structure at an 8% preferred return and 12% IRR hurdle โ€” a structure that is below current market for ground-up development, where 3-tier waterfalls with higher hurdles are standard. On the surface, the deal economics are reasonable for a ground-up development JV in the current Austin market.

However, our analysis identified eight risk provisions that warrant attention, including one critical issue: Section 7.4(b) grants the Investor a unilateral right to remove the Manager upon a determination that a "Material Adverse Event" has occurred, a term defined broadly enough to encompass market downturns, construction delays, and cost overruns that are endemic to ground-up development. This removal trigger, combined with a development fee clawback provision that lacks any cure period and a 90% capital call dilution penalty, creates a scenario where the sponsor could lose both its management position and its accrued economics based on circumstances largely outside its control. The absence of an independent determination mechanism for the removal trigger is the single most significant issue in this Agreement.

On the positive side, the Agreement includes meaningful protections that suggest room for negotiation: promote participation despite only a 5% capital contribution, a robust tax distribution provision, and an information rights framework that exceeds the statutory minimum under 6 Del. C. ยง 18-305. We recommend that Crestview negotiate targeted amendments to the three must-change provisions identified below before execution. The deal is commercially attractive, but the current draft allocates construction and market risk almost entirely to the sponsor while the investor retains optionality to exit the management relationship at minimal cost.

Deal Economics

Total capitalization: $62,000,000. Equity split 5% Sponsor / 95% Investor. Preferred return: 8% cumulative, compounded annually. Promote waterfall: 80/20 above 8% pref to 12% IRR; 70/30 above 12% IRR. Development fee: 3% of hard costs (~$1.86M). Asset management fee: 2% of gross revenues post-stabilization.

Document Details

Effective Date
March 15, 2025
Term
Perpetual until dissolution; no fixed term. Project-level hold period anticipated 7-10 years with sale permitted after Year 3 of stabilization (Section 11.1(a)).
Governing Law
Delaware (venue: Travis County, Texas)

Verdict

NOT SIGNABLE AS-IS

Must Change:

  • โ—Investor removal trigger must include independent determination mechanism and cure period (Section 7.4(b)) โ€” the current provision gives the Investor de facto discretion to remove the Manager for inherent development risks
  • โ—Capital call dilution penalty must be reduced from 90% to no more than 50% with a cure period (Section 3.4(b)) โ€” the current penalty is disproportionate and functionally confiscatory
  • โ—Fee clawback must be aligned with lender cure periods and limited to actual acceleration or foreclosure events (Section 6.3(c)) โ€” clawback surviving a cured default is commercially unreasonable

Deadlines & Conditions

5 items

Capital Call Funding

15 business days from Capital Call Notice

If Missed

Automatic 90% dilution of defaulting member's unreturned capital contributions; no cure period

Action By

All Members

Section 3.4(b)

Annual Budget Submission

60 days prior to start of each fiscal year

If Missed

Prior year budget continues at 103% escalation; Manager loses discretionary spending above line items

Action By

Manager

Section 5.1(b)

Audited Financial Statements Delivery

90 days following end of each fiscal year

If Missed

Potential default under reporting covenants; Investor may engage auditor directly at Manager's expense

Action By

Manager

Section 12.3(a)

Project Substantial Completion

Within 180 days of projected completion date

If Missed

Triggers Material Adverse Event definition โ€” may enable Investor removal of Manager

Action By

Manager

Section 1.1 / Section 7.4(b)

Investor ROFO Response Period

45 days from receipt of sale intent notice (after Year 3 of stabilization)

If Missed

Manager loses right of first offer; Investor may market project to third parties

Action By

Manager

Section 11.1(b)

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